
Market
Perspective Full Year 2003 and Outlook |
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| It
was an eventful year and a profitable one for investors. Memorable 2003
headlines included the war and subsequent “instability” in Iraq, mutual
fund scandals, real and perceived terrorist threats, and accounting scandals.
It was also a year of very stimulative monetary and fiscal policies that
produced economic growth that was well above expectations and an increase
in consumer confidence. As a result, stock and commodity markets around
the globe surged. And while longer-term interest rates rose in most developed
markets, improved credit quality helped to drive spreads lower. Thus, even
bond investors enjoyed modest returns for the year. Finally, the dollar
fell sharply against the currencies of most developed countries. This meant
even better returns for U.S.-dollar investors in foreign stock and bond
markets. |
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| Economic
Review |
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| The
global economy showed improvement throughout 2003, culminating in fourth
quarter reports of near record-setting expansion. In the U.S., all parts
of the economy delivered heartening news. Third quarter real GDP rose at
the fastest annualized pace (+8.2%) in 20 years, third quarter non-farm
productivity had its largest quarterly increase (+9.4%) in 20 years, a prominent
survey of manufacturing activity also reached a 20-year high, housing starts
reached a 17-year high in November, and the inventory-sales ratio fell to
its lowest reading on record. Perhaps the best part of all this good news
was that it translated into a 25% year-over-year gain in corporate profits,
using the government’s statistics. Also, inflation failed to threaten, which
allowed the Fed to maintain its accommodative policy throughout 2003 even
as the economy was gathering steam. |
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| Evidence
of improvements outside of the U.S. has also been encouraging. These improvements
are creating a real possibility that the major economies around the globe
will be moving upward together rather than unsynchronized (the latter has
typically been the case in the past). Perhaps most importantly, Germany
and Japan both made strides in addressing the necessary structural reforms
to improve the health of two of the world’s largest economies. In Germany,
for instance, Chancellor Schroeder appeared to make progress with his “Agenda
2010” program of tax cuts and structural reforms. Meanwhile, Japan’s manufacturing
activity showed hopeful signs of improving late in 2003, although deflation
remained a concern. While neither of these two nations actually reported
meaningful growth in their overall economies, the improvements were tangible.
Other nations benefited from the sharp expansion in the U.S., particularly
exporters of raw materials and high tech goods. |
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| The
U.S. real estate market soared to new heights in 2003. Home values rose
significantly, and the latest price gains came on top of already impressive
appreciation in recent years. Real estate strength and consumer spending
have been aided by extraordinarily low mortgage interest rates, which moved
up only slightly compared with historic lows in 2002. Low rates made it
easier for buyers and also continued the mortgage refinance boom begun in
2002. |
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| Equity
Review |
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| Stocks
rose sharply around the globe in 2003, also concluding with a nice fourth
quarter rally. In the U.S., the broad market (using, for example, the Russell
3000, Wilshire 5000, and S&P 500 indices) rose about 30% for the year.
By most measures, it was the first calendar year rise for the U.S. equity
market since 1999, and its best year since 1997. Performance by quality
was one of the more compelling factors throughout 2003. In essence, the
lower quality stocks (no earnings, extremely low price, smallest market
cap, low quality rating, etc.) were far and away the best performers during
the market’s rally. While most stocks rose, as would be expected by the
economic improvements, low-quality stocks rose exponentially. This not only
raised concerns about the validity of the rally, but it also made it difficult
for most fundamentally-focused mutual fund managers to add value above and
beyond the investment benchmarks. |
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| Global
stock returns are summarized in the following table; please see footnotes
for enhanced understanding: |
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During the fourth quarter, stock prices rose much more broadly, suggesting that share price and company performance started to reconnect. Within the Russell 3000, for instance, stocks with earnings rose as high as stocks without earnings. Performance attribution by S&P Common Stock Ranking showed only modest dispersion between high-rated stocks and low-rated stocks. |
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| In
2003, there were moderate performance disparities among the various segments
of the U.S. stock market, particularly favoritism for smaller, more growth-oriented
companies. Nothwithstanding, there were no real laggards due to the widespread
nature of investor optimism. |
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| 1.
The average growth fund gained 34.8% in 2003, a modest victory over the
average value fund, which returned 32.1% (data per Morningstar; value and
growth refer to contrasting stock-picking styles). The outperformance of
growth styles had roots in the tech/telecom sell-off of 2000-2002: many
shares had nowhere to go but up. |
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| 2.
The market was somewhat discriminating as to market capitalization. The
average large cap fund gained 27.8% last year. By comparison, the average
mid-cap fund provided a return of 35.8%, and the average small cap fund
was up 43.8% (data per Morningstar; market capitalization generally corresponds
to and indicates the size and age of a company). Accordingly, large caps
trailed smaller capitalization stocks for the fifth year in a row, after
a long period of large cap outperformance in the mid-1990’s. |
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| Longer-term data continue to reflect the extent of the 2000-2002 bear market correction, especially among larger capitalization stocks. The table below showing annualized five-year returns indicates the data: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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As noted previously, value stock returns should equal or exceed growth stock returns, and small cap returns should equal or exceed large cap returns in the long run. |
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| After
outperformance three of the last four years, the results of active fund
managers again beat the S&P 500 index of blue chip stocks; their advantage
was about three percentage points. The typical fund holds at least some
small and medium cap stocks, and their performance was considerably better
than large caps. Thus, management fees were readily overcome in this year’s
comparison to the index. |
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| REIT’s
and other real estate securities had very good results for the fourth year
in a row. Returns were about five percentage points above the average diversified
U.S. equity mutual fund. |
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| The
robust returns for broad, capitalization-weighted market indexes actually
underrepresented performance at the level of individual stocks. In 2003,
for the three U.S. stock exchanges combined, 6,517 stocks advanced and only
906 stocks declined. The corresponding advance/decline ratio of 7.19 is
unprecedented in the 14-year period we have been tracking. The history of
the advance/decline ratio for 1990-2003 years is shown in the table on the
next page; returns for the equally weighted version of the Wilshire 5000,
a broad market indicator, are included to aid in calibrating the data shown
for the advance/decline ratio and reveal that the 2003 level of this unweighted
index was also much higher than any other year in the 14-year period. |
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The history shows a significant anomaly in 1999, when the Wilshire 5000 index soared but most stocks actually fell. And in 1994, the index indicated a minor decline but the advance/decline ratio was at its lowest for the years shown. |
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| The
upshot is that the advance/decline ratio has its limitations. An important
shortcoming of the advance/decline ratio is that it provides no information
about the magnitude of the advances and declines. In spite of the statistical
issues, the history of the advance/decline ratio suggests that the prices
of U.S. stocks may have run too high in the 2003 rally. |
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| Non-U.S.
markets also had a strong final quarter and full year 2003. For much of
the year, investors pursued the more speculative segments of the foreign
equity markets. The MSCI EAFE Small-Cap Index, for instance, nearly doubled
the performance of the EAFE Index for 2003. Also, gains in emerging market
equities were impressive, as the MSCI EMF Index gained 46.7% in local currencies
for the year. Latin America led the way with a 67% return in local currencies.
Thus, for the third straight year, emerging markets outperformed the developed
world. |
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| For
U.S. investors, the foreign markets were even more lucrative given the performance
of most foreign currencies versus the U.S. dollar. The euro rose over 20%
versus the dollar during 2003, while the British pound and Japanese yen
both appreciated about 11%. The currencies of Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand rose even more. Thus, U.S. investors who purchased stocks and bonds
in these markets had their returns compounded by these currency gains. |
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| Alternative
Strategies |
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| The
three funds we have been recommending provided a combined return of 10.9%
in 2003. The result was about in line with returns achieved by conservative
hedge funds as a whole. The results were below the broad market due to the
defensive nature of the strategies employed and their low stock market correlation. |
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| Fixed
Income Review |
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| A
global increase in interest rates in 2003 was one consequence of the improved
economic backdrop and increased risk appetite of investors. In the U.S.,
interest rates fluctuated throughout the year. Yields fell pretty consistently
during the first half of 2003 but reversed sharply in July, as rates shot
up by 1 percentage point (off a low base of 3.5%) causing July to be one
of the worst months for the bond market on record. Rates did settle a little
bit in August and September before creeping higher another 25-40 basis points
(bps) during the fourth quarter. The net change for the year was a modest
rise in rates across the yield curve. For the year, the coupon return from
government bonds overcame this drop in rates to deliver a slightly positive
return for investors. Meanwhile, the returns from corporate bonds and other
spread sectors of the bond market were quite a bit better. The perceived
credit quality of corporate bonds in general rose in response to the improved
macroeconomic backdrop. Thus, corporates (+6.9% in 2003) offered bond investors
satisfactory returns. This improvement in perceived credit quality, the
increase in investors’ appetite for risk, and the search for yield in a
low interest rate environment all converged to create a near perfect scenario
for high yield bonds, which returned nearly 28% in 2003 according to the
Credit Suisse First Boston index. The other spread sectors (mortgages and
other asset-backed securities) had mixed results relative to Treasuries.
The table and footnotes below present fixed income results: |
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To varying degrees, most developed bond markets around the globe experienced a rise in the level of interest rates. Japan was an exception where rates fell very slightly in the shorter maturity ranges and were basically unchanged in its medium- to longer-term bonds. The net result of all this was a return pattern similar to the U.S.: marginal change in value for non-U.S. governments and more meaningful gains for non-U.S. corporates. Still, U.S. investors in these bonds also benefited from the rise in most developed currencies versus the U.S. dollar (as described above). Thus, foreign bonds were yet another good source of returns in 2003, with some developed countries offering dollar-based returns in excess of 20%. |
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| Outlook
for 2004 |
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| We
don’t favor market predictions, especially in absolute terms. As you know,
we argue that the future is unknowable. The interplay of socio-economic
and geopolitical factors is just too complicated to predict. Thus, we are
against trying to time the market. However, we will identify factors and
issues that are important in 2004 and beyond. These are typically historical
macroeconomic waypoints and trends which can help us narrow the range of
potential outcomes in the future. One example would be the level of U.S.
interest rates. Thus, we will venture a general outlook and some comments
regarding relative performance. |
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| The
first overriding issue for 2004 is the magnitude and nature of U.S. economic
recovery, a carryover issue two years ago in a row. The jobless nature of
the current recovery is a concern, and much like at yearend 2002, the future
course of the global economy and the outlook for corporate profits again
remain unclear. On average, forecasters expect continued expansion of the
economy as the year progresses, but not at the pace seen in 2003. |
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| The
recovery's characteristics will have a significant impact on U.S. stock
and bond markets. Further, the U.S. economy is the global engine, and its
strength will dictate to a large degree economic and market strength overseas. |
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| A
key related issue is how soon will interest rates rise and how much. At
historically low levels, they are a major contributor to economic strength.
As an example, low mortgage rates have fueled all sorts of consumer spending.
Most observers expect an increase, but not until after the national election
in November. |
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| The
third overriding issue is the impact of the high valuations of U.S. stocks
on their potential performance in 2004. Due to the 2003 rally, stocks in
the S&P 500 trade at about 27 times their earnings for the past twelve
months. This multiple is well above the historic average of 16. Thus, current
prices have almost no margin for safety, meaning the future has to unfold
very positively for valuations to hold. |
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| I
also have to mention the challenging geopolitical situation. This of course
includes Iraq. Keeping the peace in Iraq and restoring the country after
a successful military campaign are proving vexious to say the least. Overall,
Iraq remains a wildcard: protracted problems could be a persistent drag
on stock markets. Other international hotspots include Afghanistan, Kashmir,
and the continued conflicts across the Middle East. |
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| Another
important issue is the strength of the U.S. dollar versus the euro and other
foreign currencies. Will the greenback continue depreciating, which allows
unhedged U.S. investors to reap currency profits, rather than the currency
losses so prevalent during much of the 1990's? The U.S. has been running
steadily increasing balance of payment deficits (i.e., we import much more
than we export). This huge appetite for imports produces what is called
the current account deficit. For years, this deficit in the account for
goods and services has been more than offset by a large annual surplus in
the investment account (i.e., foreigners have been large net investors in
the U.S., including direst investments in real estate and facilities as
well as net purchases of U.S. stocks and bonds). As a result, the dollar
selling pressure generated by U.S. consumers has been more than offset by
the dollar buying pressure of foreign investors. For years demand generally
exceeded supply, and the dollar appreciated, meaning the buying power of
the U.S. dollar has increased versus the currencies of many other nations. |
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| The
on-going risk is that expected returns on U.S. assets aren't high enough
to attract sufficient flows to plug the current account deficit. In fact,
the tables definitely turned in 2002. It was no surprise that with our economy
sputtering, our stock market in a nosedive, and with accounting scandals
and the Iraq war mobilization, the dollar was pummeled. However, 2003 was
puzzling because the reviving U.S. economy, sizzling U.S. stock markets,
and seeming capping of the Iraq situation did not stop the dollar’s decline.
We need to be concerned about a snowballing situation, at least in the short-run,
wherein the dollar's decline produces currency losses for foreign investors
(remember, their currencies are appreciating versus the dollar), leading
to a reduction in foreign ownership of U.S. stocks and bonds, leading to
less demand for U.S. dollars and in turn further erosion of the value of
the U.S. dollar, further reducing the returns and attractiveness of U.S.
securities to foreigners, and so on. |
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| The
final key issue (every year) is the level of inflation and resource usage
worldwide. To a large degree, these levels will determine the fate of tangible
asset prices and in turn the returns of real estate and energy funds and
inflation indexed bonds. The inflation rate also impacts the financials
sector as well as the broader markets for stocks and bonds. The issue boils
down to whether strong fiscal and monetary stimuli currently in place are
excessive and lead sooner rather than later to resource shortages and reignition
of inflation. |
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| In
considering these very difficult, interrelated issues, we are swayed, as
usual, by what history reveals, namely, that economies and markets are cyclical
and seek equilibrium and that investment results regress to the mean. Therefore,
historical patterns and averages will ultimately prevail. Keeping in mind
the historical perspective and favorable long-term secular trends, here
are educated guesses regarding the key issues and outlook: |
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| 1.
The U.S. economy and the global economy will continue building momentum
through at least mid-year. The direction after mid-year is unclear. 2. U.S. stock markets will produce positive,
respectable returns. The positive upward momentum, election year dynamics,
and continuing fiscal and monetary stimulus should offset the main negative
factors, continuing high valuations and the declining dollar. 3. The various stock asset classes will
perform comparably over the next year because relative valuations are
about in line. 4. The rate of inflation will hold at
about current, reduced levels at least through mid-year, but thereafter
inflation rates may begin to move upward. 5. With inflation low and economic activity
moderate, and investment grade yields also low, we expect positive total
returns for bonds, but at the low end of historical averages. Although
the risk of price depreciation due to interest rate increases is much
higher than in recent years we do not expect actual losses in 2004. 6. The dollar's weakness will continue.
Again in 2004, inflows of foreign capital will be inadequate to offset
our continuing trade deficit. Therefore, the dollar must give up some
value. 7. The outlook is good for foreign stocks
and bonds as a result of projected improving economic and market conditions
and a reasonable opportunity of currency gains. |
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As usual, we have found it difficult to develop an outlook for the coming year. Over and over again, we have seen the unreliability of short-term economic and market forecasts and the unpredictable nature of markets. More than usual, geopolitical risks could wreak havoc with these predictions, and as usual, there is always the risk of the totally unexpected. If the concerns expressed below manifest themselves earlier than expected, results in 2004 could be considerably worse than indicated above. |
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| Beyond
2004 |
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| As for the outlook beyond 2004, we have increasing concern. The concern stems at least in part from a long career in finance advocating living within one’s means and saving for both a rainy day and retirement security. We are beginning to believe the tax-cut and deficit spree of the last few years, which have juiced up the economy, will likely exact a price in later stagnation. The various potential remedies for our growing debt levels and trade deficits are tax increases, spending cuts, and higher interest rates, in some combination. These remedies will all inflict pain, pain which we are currently deferring. Further, as some 77 million baby boomers begin to retire this decade, U.S. Social Security and Medicare will begin to move into the red as well, eventually by trillions of dollars, according to a report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF report predicts no pro-growth strategy can make up such shortages and warns that mounting U.S. debt jeopardizes global financial stability. The Bush administration plans to make permanent tax cuts the “very center” of its fiscal policy. Also, Congress has just enacted a new major entitlement, the Medicare prescription benefit. Treasury Secretary John Snow calls the deficits “entirely manageable.” We shall see. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||